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Articles
Rowland J. Harrison* The Offshore Mineral
Resources Agreement in the
Maritime Provinces
I. Introduction
On February 1, 1977, the Prime Minister of Canada and the
Premiers of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island
signed a "Memorandum of Understanding in Respect of the
Administration and Management of Mineral Resources Offshore of
the Maritime Provinces".' The Understanding removes a major
impediment to potential development of any offshore petroleum
resources of the Maritimes, after nearly ten years of federal-
provincial negotiations, and more generally represents a quite
unique development in Canadian constitutional relations. At the
time of its execution, it was described variously as "a mile-stone in
federal-regional relations ' 2 and "federalism at its best". 3
*Rowland J. Harrison, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
This article is an expanded version of a paper entitled Jurisdictional and
Administrative Arrangements between Canada and the Maritime Provinces for the
Development of Offshore Mineral Resources by the present writer and Mr. J.
Gerald Godsoe, Jr., of the Nova Scotia Bar. That paper was prepared for the Office
of the Premier of Nova Scotia for presentation by the authors to the Fifth Annual
Conference of the New England Governors and the Eastern Canadian Premiers held
at Digby, Nova Scotia, June 23 to 26, 1977. Mr. Godsoe is Chairman of the
Maritime Provinces Co-ordinating Committee on Offshore Resources to whom
Professor Harrison has served as a consultant. The permission of the Office of the
Premier and of Mr. Godsoe to develop that paper into this article is gratefully
acknowledged. Responsibility for the opinions expressed and any errors is,
however, exclusively that of the present writer.
1. Hereafter referred to as "the Understanding."
2. Dr. William Jenkins, then Executive Vice-President of the Atlantic Provinces
Economic Council, as quoted in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, February 2, 1977.
3. Premier Alex Campbell of Prince Edward Island, id. Premier Richard Hatfield
of New Brunswick described the Understanding as "a good and innovative
example of how the federal system can be made to work", id. Premier Gerald
Regan of Nova Scotia commented that "the path of federal-provincial relations will
be affected more by the display of flexibility achieved than by the event itself", and
described the occasion of signing the Memorandum as "unquestionably the most
satisfying day of my career in public life", id. The official Joint Communique
released by the Parties on the occasion of signing the Memorandum said: "The
Memorandum is a significant demonstration of federalism accommodating
provincial needs and aspirations in a flexible structure that can work to the greater
benefit of all parties."
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In summary, the Understanding sets aside the competing claims
to jurisdiction by Canada on the one hand and the Provinces on the
other; provides that the Federal Parliament and the provincial
legislatures will be asked to implement an administrative and
management regime by joint legislative action; provides for the joint
constitution of a Maritime Offshore Resources Board to issue rights
in respect of off-shore mineral resources and to generally oversee
their administration and management; and evidences the agreement
of the parties that direct revenues - including, for example,
royalties, fees, bonuses and rentals - will be shared on the basis of
25 per cent to Canada and 75 per cent to the adjacent province,
subject to a regional revenue sharing pool.
Federal-provincial agreements are not, of course, new; there have
been many instances where the federal government and the
provinces have cooperated in the exercise of their respective
constitutional powers. In some cases, the device of delegating the
responsibility for administration of the legislation of one level of the
federal system to an agency established by the other level has been
employed to effectively provide for the implementation of a unified
policy by one regulatory authority.4 In other cases, the various
methods of incorporating legislation by reference have been used5
and in yet others, the several legal techniques for implementing
federal-provincial agreements have been combined. 6
In the past, however, in constitutional terms federal-provincial
cooperation has been restricted to the exercise of the respective
powers of the federal and provincial governments in complementary
ways. The various devices through which federal and provincial
laws can "interact" - to borrow the expression used by Professor
Driedger in his excellent analysis7 - have been employed to deal
with the hazy interface between federal powers and provincial
powers, 8 or, in effect, to hand over the determination of policy
under a particular power from one unit of the federal system to the
4. The Agricultural Products Marketing Act, S.C. 1949, c.16, upheld by the
Supreme Court in P.E.I. Potato Marketing Board v. Willis, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392;
[1952]4 D.L.R. 146, is an example. See now R.S.C. 1970, c. A-7.
5. The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.I-4, is given as an
exampleby E. A. Driedger in The Interaction of Federal and ProvincialLaws (1976),
54 Can. B. Rev. 695 at 703.
6. A clear example is the Motor Vehicle Transport Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. M-14,
upheld by the Supreme Court in Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport Board,
[1968] S.C.R. 569; 68 D.L.R. (2d)384, as S.C. 1954, c. 59.
7. Supra, note 5.
8. The devices employed in the Agricultural Products Marketing Act, R.S.C.
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other. 9 But in none of these past cases have the Federal government
and the provinces agreed to avoid the judicial resolution of claims
that both were making to the same jurisdiction. It is in this aspect
that the recent Memorandum of Understanding is so unique. Its
implementation, through the ensuing formal agreement and
supporting legislation, will apply a technique for the extra-judicial
"resolution" of jurisdictional issues that is untested in Canada. The
concept of that technique will be discussed in this article.
The technique is derived, at least in concept, from the method
employed in Australia to resolve the federal-state dispute there with
respect to jurisdiction over offshore petroleum resources. The
Canadian Understanding will be compared with the Australian
approach which was the subject of an exhaustive analysis by a
Select Committee of the Senate of Australia. The merits of the
technique will then be assessed. The details of the jurisdictional
dispute between Ottawa and the eastern provinces are beyond the
scope of the article, and in any event have been analysed
elsewhere, 10 but will be summarized briefly in the context of
assessing the merits of the Understanding.
II. An Outline of the Memorandum of Understanding
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by Canada, Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island has three main
purposes. First, as recognized in the preamble, the Understanding is
concerned to set aside "jurisdictional differences in order to
encourage resource exploitation in areas offshore their coasts . .. "
Spokesmen for the oil industry had claimed that the dispute over
1970, c.A-7 and the Motor Vehicle Transport Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.M-14 were
clearly aiming at this objective.
9. Again, the Motor Vehicle Transport Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.M-14 might be
regarded as an example, albeit one promoted by the problem of determining, at the
level of application of particular laws, where the interface between federal and
provincial powers lay.
10. See, for example, Cabot Martin, Newfoundland's Case on Offshore Minerals:
A Brief Outline (1975), 7 Ott.L.Rev. 34; George Steven Swan, The Newfoundland
Offshore Clains: Interface of Constitutional Federalism and International Law
(1976), 22 McGill L.J. 541; A. Kovach, An Assessment of the Merits of
Newfoundland's Claim to Offshore Mineral Resources (1975), 23 Chitty's L.J. 18.
The most thorough review of all aspects of the jurisdictional dispute is that by K.
Beauchamp, M. Crommelin, and A. R. Thompson in Jurisdictional Problems in
Canada's Offshore (1973), 11 Alta. L. Rev. 431, wherein the authors also
advocated a joint solution to the problem somewhat along the lines in fact adopted
in the Memorandum of Understanding and, very much to their credit, identified just
what would be involved in implementing such a solution.
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jurisdiction was hindering exploratory activity off the east coast."
During the exploration phase of their activities, the industry was
able to cope with the competing claims to jurisdiction by the federal
government and the provinces by taking permits from the former as
well as licences from the latter. In effect, one work programme
could be used by the companies to satisfy two obligations. But this
means of living with uncertainty as to the validity of one's title
could not realistically be carried forward to the production stage
when the permittees and licensees would have to convert their
interests to leases and would be required to pay royalties on any
commercial production twice, once to each Government. 12 Concern
for the future if commercial production became possible had a
suppressive impact on exploration activity itself13 although the
unresolved jurisdictional issue was certainly not the only - and
probably not even the major - impediment to activity off the east
coast. Nevertheless, it was clearly a factor and had to be resolved
either by agreement or by a judicial determination before there
could be any commercial oil or gas production.
The second main purpose of the Understanding, again as
recognized in the preamble, is to "encourage . . . industrial and
commercial development in the Maritime Region." To this end, the
Understanding proposes a mechanism through which the provinces
will participate directly in the management of offshore mineral
resources and spin-off developments. And thirdly, a further purpose
of the Understanding is to provide for the sharing of revenues
derived from the exploitation of offshore mineral resources.
The document is entitled a Memorandum of Understanding and
provides that the parties will proceed jointly, on the basis of the
Understanding, to the preparation of a detailed and comprehensive
11. See, for example, the remarks of the President of Mobil Oil Canada Ltd., Mr.
Arne Nielsen, published in the Proceedings of the Atlantic Petroleum Offshore
Seminar, sponsored by the Natural Resources and Energy Section of the Canadian
Bar Association in Halifax, May 27-29, 1973, at 16, where he described the
jurisdictional dispute as a "major political issue requiring immediate
attention..."
12. Beauchamp, Crommelin and Thompson, supra, note 10 at 469, suggested that
even the payment of double royalties might not be unreasonable in view of the
allegedly low rate of royalty imposed by the respective regulatory regimes.
13. Exploration activity off the coast of Labrador has been undertaken mainly by
Total Eastcan Exploration Ltd. which announced suspension of its efforts on the
same day as the Maritime Provinces and Canada executed the Memorandum of
Understanding, alleging the jurisdictional 'dispute between Newfoundland and
Ottawa as the reason for its decision. See the further discussion of this issue, infra,
[text at notes 96 to 97].
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Agreement. 14 It establishes the basic approach by the parties to
dealing with the administration and management of offshore
resources and the main points of agreement between them.
Discussions are continuing on the detailed provisions that will be
incorporated in the Agreement and on the legislation that will be
necessary to implement it.
The area to be covered by the Agreement is the seabed and
sub-soil seaward from the ordinary low water mark on the coasts of
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island to the
continental margin or to the limits of Canada's jurisdiction to
explore and exploit the seabed and subsoil, whichever may be
further. 15 As between the provinces, the area is divided on the basis
of Interprovincial Lines of Demarcation that were negotiated by the
provinces in 1964. As between Canada and the provinces, the area
is then divided into two parts. Mineral Resource Administration
Lines are to be fixed by the Agreement at least five kilometres
seaward from the ordinary low water mark. 16 The area on the
-landward side of these lines is effectively conceded to be within the
jurisdiction of the provinces, although for the sake of administrative
convenience a province may request the Maritime Offshore
Resources Board to administer the area on its behalf. 17
The area seaward of the Mineral Resource Administration Lines
will be placed under the administration and management of the
Maritime Offshore Resources Board. 18 The Board - consisting of
six members, three representing Canada and one from each of the
three provinces 19 - will perform the function that would be
performed by the Federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources
if the area were under exclusive federal jurisdiction, or by the
provincial minister of mines or of energy if the area were under
exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Specifically, the Board will issue
rights in respect of the mineral resources of the area and set the
terms and conditions pursuant to which those rights will be issued. 20
It will also have authority to commission economic, sociological
and other studies relating to the exploitation of those resources and





19. Paragraph 6. The Agreement will contain detailed provisions dealing with the
resolution of any tied vote that might arise in Board deliberations.
20. Paragraph 5(i) and (ii)
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the optimization of regional benefits to be derived by the
provinces. 21 The day to day administration and management of the
resources will be undertaken on behalf of the Board by the
appropriate federal agency at the expense of the federal
government.
22
A major responsibility of the Board of course will be to receive
and distribute all revenue derived directly from the administration
and management of the mineral resources in the area, such as
royalties, fees, bonuses and rentals. 23 The Memorandum provides
that these revenues will be distributed 25 per cent to Canada and 75
per cent to the province offshore from which the revenue is derived,
the respective provincial offshore areas being determined in
accordance with the agreed Interprovincial Lines of Demarcation
mentioned earlier. 24 Thus, if developments should prove to be
restricted to the area offshore from one province only, the other two
provinces will not receive a direct share of the 75 per cent
apportionment. The Memorandum, however, does provide that the
75 per cent share of each province shall be subject to a contribution
to a "regional revenue sharing pool" of such portion of the 75 per
cent as may be agreed upon between the provinces. 25 The details of
this regional pool and of the portion of the 75 per cent to be
contributed to it will be provided for in the.Agreement. Offsetting
this division of revenues, the Memorandum provides that the costs
of the Maritime Offshore Resources Board will be funded 25 per
cent by Canada and 75 per cent by the provinces.
26
The MemoranduM acknowledges that Sable Island is within Nova
Scotia and provides that 100 per cent of the revenues within a
revenue sharing line to be fixed by the Agreement around the Island
will accrue to Nova Scotia.27
III. The Constitutional Integrity of the Scheme
So much, then, for the general provisions of the Memorandum of
Understanding. But what of its constitutional integrity?2 8 How can
21. Paragraph 5 (iii)
22. Paragraphs 8 and 9
23. Paragraph 10
24. Paragraph 11. See supra.
25. Paragraph 11 (ii)
26. Paragraph 9
27., Paragraph 12
28. The "constitutional integrity" to be discussed here does not refer to the legal
nature of a "memorandum of understanding" or of "an agreement" between
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the Federal and provincial governments simply set aside their
jurisdictional differences?
To attempt an answer to this question the nature of the
Understanding has to be explored further. Although the preamble
thereof speaks of "setting aside jurisdictional differences", on
closer examination it becomes clear that in fact the Understanding
amounts to an agreement that jurisdiction will be exercised by both
Canada and the provinces. What really has been agreed is that
neither will interfer with or challenge the claims of the other to
jurisdiction over the offshore area for the purposes of exploring for
and exploiting its mineral resources.
There are two aspects to this. First, there has to be agreement to,
and implementation of, a single regulatory regime as an apparent
exercise of federal jurisdiction and as an apparent exercise of
provincial jurisdiction. Clearly, the federal government and the
provincial governments could not maintain the integrity of their
agreement not to interfere with each other's exercises of jurisdiction
by attempting to put in place different regimes. 29 Secondly, while
the federal government and the provinces might be agreed that they
will not challenge each other, their agreement would be of little
consequence if it could be effectively challenged by any third
party. Thus, the agreement contemplates implementation in such a
way that there is no possibility of any third party challenge or, at
least, that any such threat is minimized. Each of these aspects will
be examined further.
The Memorandum of Understanding provides that the Maritime
Offshore Resources Board will have authority to "issue rights" in
respect of the mineral resources of the offshore area and to "set the
terms and conditions pursuant to which such rights will be
issued." 30 Although not explicitly stated in the Understanding,
clearly these powers will be exercised under the terms of enabling
legislation and regulations. In fact the legislation and regulations
will be those proposed by the federal government in its Statement of
Policy on a proposed Petroleum and Natural Gas Act issued in
May, 1976.
31
Canadian Governments as such but rather the phrase refers to the integrity of the
content and objectives thereof.
29. From the perspective of those operating under the regimes there would be a
necessary conflict between regimes that were different.
30. Paragraph 5 (i) and (ii)
31. Statement of Policy, Proposed Petroletm and Natural Gas Act and New
Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations, Energy Mines and Resources Canada and
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To achieve the necessary uniformity of legislation and adminis-
tration, the Provinces will employ the already approved techniques
of incorporation by reference and delegation. Specifically, the
provincial acts implementing the Agreement will incorporate
designated federal legislation and regulations made thereunder, as
amended from time to time, as the law and regulations of the
province for the purposes of exercising provincial jurisdiction over
the offshore area. The Acts will then delegate the administration of
that legislation to the Maritime Offshore Resources Board. At the
same time, the federal legislation implementing the Agreement will
delegate the administration of the designated federal legislation to
the Board too, so far as that designated legislation applies in the
offshore area subject to the Agreement. The effect of these various
steps will be that the Board will have delegated to it the
administration of federal legislation directly by the Federal
Parliament and the administration of the same legislation qua
provincial legislation by the respective provincial legislatures.
All of this is simply in accordance with the techniques for
federal-provincial cooperation upheld by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport Board. 32 In that
case, the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Motor
Vehicle Transport Act 33 that was designed to, in effect, merge the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over interprovincial transportation
34
with provincial jurisdiction over intraprovincial transportation.
Section 3(1) was the key to the scheme and provided:
3. (1) Where in any province a licence is by the law of the
province required for the operation of a local undertaking, no
person shall operate on extra-provincial undertaking in that
province unless he holds a licence issued under the authority of
this Act.
(2) The provincial transport board in each province may in its
discretion issue a licence to a person to operate an extra-
provincial udertaking into or through the province upon the like
Indian and Northern Affairs, May, 1976, Ottawa. In announcing changes to these
proposals in a speech to the Association of Petroleum Landmen in Calgary on June
20, 1977, the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, the Honourable Alastair
Gillespie implicitly acknowledged that the proposed new federal regulatory system
will be the system to be applied by the Maritime Offshore Resources Board.
32. [1968] S.C.R. 569; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 384
33. Supra, note 9.
34. The specific purpose of the exercise was to implement a practical regulatory
regime in the wake of the opinion of the Privy Council in A. G. (Ontario) v.
Winner, [1954] A.C. 541; [195414 D.L.R. 657.
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terms and conditions and in the like manner as if the
extra-provincial undertaking operated in the province were a
local undertaking.
In upholding the validity of the section, the Court made it clear,
first, that Parliament can adopt "in the exercise of its exclusive
power . . . the legislation of another body as it may from time to
time exist . . .,,35 and, secondly, that the administration of that
adopted legislation can then be delegated to a provincial subordinate
agency. 36 There is nothing in the Court's judgment to suggest that
the reverse flow, as it were, would not be equally acceptable, so that
a province could, just as validly, adopt federal legislation and then
delegate to a federal subordinate agency.
Thus, the method proposed for the implementation of a single
regulatory regime for the administration of offshore mineral
resources would seem to be unimpeachable. But what of the second
aspect to the agreement to avoid a determination of constitutional
jurisdiction? How can the risk of a third party challenge to the
scheme be avoided?
The answer, of course, is that the risk cannot be eliminated 37 but
it can be minimized. Indeed, it can probably be minimized to such
an extent as to become hypothetical by simply ensuring that no one
has any real interest in challenging the scheme. Again it becomes
necessary to explore further the nature of the proposed method of
implementing the Memorandum of Understanding.
In commenting on Coughlin, Professor Driedger writes:
The result is that the provincial Board draws its powers from two
sources, powers in relation to extra-provincial carriage from
Parliament, and powers in relation to local carriage from the
legislature. Or, it could be said that there are two Boards
consisting of the same persons. 
38
35. [1968] S.C.R. 569 at 575; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 384 at 388 per Cartwright J. for the
majority.
36. This proposition had already been established in Willis, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392;
[195214 D.L.R. 146.
37. The Canadian courts have consistently rejected any overt legislative attempts
to prevent judicial review of the constitutional validity of legislation, as have the
courts of all Anglo-American federal systems. See further the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in B.C. Power Corporation, Ltd., v. Royal Trust
Company et al., [1962] S.C.R. 642; 34 D.L.R. (2d) 196, and the observations of
Fisher and Masten JJ.A., in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ottawa Valley Power
Co. v. H.E.P.C., [1937] O.R. 265; [1936] 4 D.L.R. 594. See also the comments
of Laskin J. in Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 at
151-52; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at I 1 and the further passage cited infra, note 47.
38. Supra, note 5 at 712. The present writer made a somewhat similar observation
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So too with the proposed Maritime Offshore Resources Board. The
Board will have delegated to it by both the Federal Parliament and
the provincial legislatures the powers of each to administer and
manage the mineral resources of the offshore. The Board will
exercise federal powers and provincial powers but always in the
same way. Every Board action will rest on a federal "chain of
title", as it were, and on a provincial "chain of title". In other
words, from a provincial point of view, the Board will be acting on
behalf of the Province and under provincial authorization, whereas
from the federal point of view it will be acting on behalf of and
under the authorization of Canada.
There is, however, an important distinction between the situation
of the Resources Board and that of the Ontario Municipal Board in
Coughlin, a distinction that highlights the uniqueness of the
technique that will be employed in implementing the Offshore
Agreement. As is clear from Professor Driedger's comment and the
legislation itself considered in Coughlin, the powers exercised by
the Ontario Municipal Board are not simply drawn from two sources
but are two different powers. One power, drawn from the federal
legislation, is that in relation to extra-provincial carriage, whereas
the other, drawn from the provincial legislation, is that in relation to
local or intraprovincial carriage. It is true that, as a result of the
federal Act, the two powers are exercised in the same way but they
are exercised in that same way in relation to two constitutionally
distinct activities.
The Maritime Offshore Resources Board, however, will not
purport to exercise two powers in relation to two different activities.
Instead it will exercise power in relation to one activity - not
knowing from whom its power is derived but knowing that it is
derived from either the Federal Parliament or the provincial
legislature and that it could not be derived from any other. Thus, a
challenge to its authority could be met with the response that the
Board has the same authority conferred on it by both Parliament and
the legislatures - which chain of authority is the valid one is of
purely academic interest.
in concluding that the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission,
established by Acts of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, is
in theory three Commissions "consisting in each case of the same members and
exercising precisely the same powers in each province" in Constitutional
Implications of the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission, Dalhousie
Continuing Legal Education Series, No. 8, The University and the Law, Halifax,
February 28-March 1, 1975, 162 at 164.
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This analysis, of course, does not guarantee that a challenge to
the scheme will not be made. But if such a challenge were made and
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the implementing
legislation at one level was not constitutionally valid, the legislation
at the other level would then be valid automatically and would be
determined to support the actions of the Board. In other words, a
constitutional challenge would only result in a determination of
which particular chain of title supported the Board's jurisdiction and
would not of itself result in the dissolution of the Board, nor affect
its past actions.
It is recognized that the legislation will have to be very carefully
framed to ensure that the watertight compartments of the ship of
state will be joined, "to carry the same cargo" in Professor
Driedger's words, 3 9 but the ship will be sailing in unchartered
waters. This however, is a problem of care and not of feasibility. If
it is done properly a challenge to the constitutional validity of either
the federal or the provincial acts would be a "zero-sum game."
Certainly, this consequence would be sufficient to deter a
challenge to the scheme from the source whence it might otherwise
be most likely to come - the operators in the offshore mineral play,
say an oil company actively exploring or producing in the area and
subject to the regulatory regime imposed by the legislation. There
can be nothing to gain for such a company in establishing by judicial
decision that it is subject to the same legislation thereafter
determined to be valid, say, federal legislation. 40 It is also
reasonable to assume that none of the Parties to the Memorandum of
Understanding and the subsequent Agreement would challenge its
own legislation or that of any other Party.
That leaves two other possible sources of constitutional challenge
- other provinces and other individuals. A challenge by a
non-party province is a distinct possibility at first glance. Such a
province might argue that the mineral resources of the offshore area
are an exclusive constitutional responsibility of the Federal
government which it would be improper for it to, if not decline, at
least share in a way not permitted by the British North America
39. Supra, note 5 at 695.
40. The distinction from Coughlin, [1968] S.C.R. 569; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 384
becomes clear again here. Coughlin of course hoped that a successful challenge to
the federal legislation there in issue would leave the field vacant and him free of
regulation. As an interprovincial carrier he would not have been subject to
regulation by the Board under provincial legislation in the absence of the federal
legislation.
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Act. 41 The argument might be motivated by financial considerations
on the premise that the challenging province might participate more
- albeit indirectly - in any revenues derived from the exploitation
of offshore mineral resources if all those revenues went to the
federal government rather than substantially to the Maritime
Provinces.
This is certainly what happened in the United States when
Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act 42 of 1953. Under this
Act, parts of off-shore areas that had been determined by the
Supreme Court to be within exclusive federal jurisdiction 43 were
ceded by Congress to the littoral states. The legislation was
challenged immediately on the ground that it was detrimental to the
interests of those states to which there was no such cession. The
Supreme Court denied the challenge 44 but it is the fact of the
challenge that is of interest in the present context. Yet, even so, it is
my view that the risk of such a challenge in Canada, if any, is
minimal simply because the provinces that will benefit from the
implementation of the Offshore Agreement are "have not"
provinces which, it is accepted, are entitled to preferred financial
treatment by the Federal Government.
45
There still remains, however, the possibility of a challenge to the
constitutional validity of the legislation implementing the Agree-
ment by some other third party. There is a clear trend in the
Supreme Court of Canada towards greater flexibility in determining
matters of standing, 46 it would seem at least partly on the ground
that there is a public interest in insisting upon constitutional
behaviour from Parliament and the legislatures. 47 But it is also clear
41. 30-31 Vict., c.3 (as amended) (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, Append. II, No. 5
42. 43 U.S.C. 1301
43. U.S. v. California (1947), 332 U.S. 19; 67 S. Ct. 1658; U.S. v. Louisiana
(1950), 339U.S. 699; 70 S.Ct. 914; U.S. v. Texas (1950), 339 U.S. 707; 70S. Ct.
918.
44. Alabama v. Texas (1954), 347 U.S. 272
45. This consideration was fairly obviously a major reason that the Federal
Government was prepared to negotiate a joint arrangement with the Provinces at
all.
46. See Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canada. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; 43 D.L.R.
(3d) 1; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; 5 N.R. 43;
55 D.L.R. (3d) 632. These developments are discussed in David Mvullan, Standing
After McNeil (1976), 8 Ottawa L. Rev. 32.
47. In Thorson, Laskin J. said ([1975] I S.C.R. 138 at 145; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 7):
A more telling consideration for me ... is whether a question of
constitutionality should be immunized from judicial review by denying standing
to anyone to challenge the impugned statute. That, in my view, is the
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that the matter is one for the exercise of discretion on the part of the
Court. On the one hand, the almost certain outcome of any
challenge - namely, that it would result only in the determination
of which legislation constitutionally supported the Maritime
Offshore Resources Board - would discourage any challenge. In
the recent cases there standing to challenge the constitutional
validity of legislation has been given, the plaintiff has had
something to gain by seeking to have the challenged legislation
struck down, if only the removal of legislation that implemented a
policy he found offensive.48 But, as discussed earlier, a successful
challenge in the present context would not result in the defeat of any
"offensive" policy but, on the contrary, would reinforce the
validity of the legislation implementing the policy as enacted by one
of either the Federal Parliament or the provincial legislatures. On
the other hand, it cannot be ignored that the right to insist on
constitutional behaviour as such has been a factor in the Supreme
Court's view in deciding that standing should be granted in any
particular case. In summary, what this would suggest is that the risk
of a third party seeking standing to challenge the legislation
implementing the Offshore Agreement is minimal but if standing
were sought it is quite possible that the Supreme Court would grant
it. There is, of course, nothing that either Parliament or the
legislatures can do about this but accept the risk.
For all practical purposes it would seem reasonable to assume that
the federal government and the provinces have struck upon a
technique whereby the issue of constitutional validity can be kept
from judicial resolution for so long as there is a will to do so. By
definition, it is not a technique whereby the distribution of
legislative powers can be simply rearranged at the pleasure of the
governments in the sense of one level taking some heads of power
and the other level taking others, each to the exclusion of the other.
On the contrary, the whole concept depends upon agreement to the
consequence of the judgments below in the present case. The substantive issue
raised by the plaintiff's action is a justiciable one; and, primafacie, it would be
strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a question of
alleged excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally within the scope of the
judicial process, would be made the subject of adjudication.
48. In Thorson, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1, there was no suggestion
that the reason for the challenge was to ensure constitutional behaviour from
Parliament for its own sake. Clearly the constitutional challenge was simply the
particular means chosen to attack the policy of the Official Languages Act. So too
in MacNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632 the target of the challenge
was really film censorship.
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joint exercise of legislative powers in such a way that the question
of who in fact has the power becomes one of only academic interest.
The merits of the technique so understood will be discussed
further but it is proposed first to digress to discuss briefly another
constitutional aspect of the Memorandum of Understanding and
then to examine a similar scheme in Australia where the technique
of resolution by avoidance seems to have originated.
It will be recalled that the Memorandum of Understanding
provides for the offshore area to be divided, as between the
provinces, on the basis of Interprovincial Lines of Demarcation that
were negotiated by the provinces in 1964. 49 What is the status of
these offshore boundaries?
There is no provision in the British North America Act 50 whereby
the provinces can establish their mutual boundaries simply by
agreement between themselves. The British North America Act of
1871,51 however, provided:
3. The Parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the
consent of the Legislature of any Province of the said Dominion,
increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of such Province,
upon such terms and conditions and may be agreed to by the said
Legislature, and may, with the like consent, make provision
respecting the effect and operation of any such increase or
diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any Province
affected thereby.
This section could be used by Parliament to define the
inter-provincial boundaries in the offshore area in accordance with
the agreed Interprovincial Lines of Demarcation and thus give some
legal validity to what is at present nothing more than a
"gentlemen's agreement". In stating this, it is recognized that the
question of offshore boundaries between the Maritime Provinces
only arises if those provinces in fact extend beyond the lower water
mark, 52 in which event there must already be an offshore
interprovincial boundary, albeit undetermined. 53 This postulate,
however, would not prevent the redefinition of those boundaries in
49. Supra, [text at notes 15 to 16]
50. 30-31 Vict., c.3 (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 5
51. 34 & 35 Vict., c. 28 (U.K.)
52. This would seem to be the only basis on which the Maritime Provinces could
have any jurisdiction in the offshore area because of the restriction on their
legislative competence by section 92 of the B.N.A. Act to matters "in each
Province". See the further discussion, infra.
53. It would be extraordinary if these "natural" boundaries should happen to
coincide with the agreed Lines of Demarcation. Presumably the "natural"
Offshore Mineral Agreement 259
accordance with the 1964 Interprovincial Agreement. But even this
step is unnecessary so long as the device employed to keep the
matter of jurisdiction from judicial resolution is successful and so
long as the three Maritime Provinces continue to be agreed on their
respective shares of the offshore area. It would only be after a
Supreme Court ruling in favour of exclusive provincial jurisdiction
over the offshore area that the legal location of the offshore
inter-provincial boundaries might provoke a challenge from
someone claiming that a particular area was within the jurisdiction
of one of the Provinces rather than another.
IV The Australian Scheme Compared
The underlying concept of the Canadian Memorandum of
Understanding is that the problem of uncertain jurisdiction can be
accommodated, not by seeking to clarify the uncertainty, but rather
by discouraging - hopefully preventing - any challenge to the
agreed policy and the legislative scheme to implement it. The
approach seems to have emerged first in Australia in an attempt to
deal here with the same issue of whether the petroleum resources of
the continental shelf were subject to federal or state jurisdiction. As
in Canada, there was considerable pressure to get the matter
resolved but, at the same time, reluctance to submit to 4n all or
nothing resolution in the High Court of Australia.
On October 16, 1967, the Commonwealth and the six States
signed an Agreement, 54 the preamble of which provides, inter alia:
AND WHEREAS the Governments of the Commonwealth and of
the States have decided, in the national interest, that, without
raising questions concerning, and without derogating from, their
boundaries would be established by a judicial application of the equidistant or some
similar principle.
54. An Agreement relating to the Exploration for, and the Exploitation of, the
Petroleum Resources, and certain Other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of
Australia and of certain Territories of the Commonwealth and of certain other
Submerged Land, dated October 16, 1967, hereafter referred to as the "Offshore
Petroleum Agreement". The Agreement is printed as Appendix A to the Report
from the Senate Select Committee on Off-Shore Petroleum Resources, the
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1971, hereafter referred
to as "the Senate Report". Some confusion might be avoided by explaining that
the Australian Offshore Petroleum Agreement was really concerned only with
petroleum. The Canadian Memorandum of Understanding on the other hand is
concerned with mineral resources, although petroleum is the only mineral of
immediate interest in the offshore area and the only mineral for which a detailed
regulatory regime has been developed in any detail as yet.
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respective constitutional powers, they should co-operate for the
purpose of ensuring the legal effectiveness of authorities to
explore for or to exploit the petroleum resources of those
submerged lands...
The Agreement went on to provide that the commonwealth
government and each state government would submit to their
respective parliaments bills in the form of the draft bills set out as
Schedules to the Agreement 55 and would "use all reasonable
endeavours to secure the passing and the coming into operation" of
the bills. 56 The bills then, in identical terms, provided for a
Common Mining Code to apply to the adjacent areas of each state
and to be administered by the Designated Authority for each
adjacent area. 57 The Designated Authorities were in fact the state
mining authorities, with a proviso that the Commonwealth would be
consulted by any state before granting, renewing, varying or
transferring rights and would be able to prevail in any difference of
opinion from the state where it, the Commonwealth, was of the
opinion that its other express constitutional responsibilities required
a different decision. 58 Inevitably, there was provision in the
Agreement for sharing of royalty revenues - 40 per cent to the
Commonwealth and 60 per cent to adjacent state. 59
All of the bills provided for in the Agreement were subsequently
enacted by the respective parliaments with the consequence that the
same Common Mining Code was in force in all of the offshore area
as the result of Commonwealth legislation and, in each adjacent
area, as the result of legislation of the adjacent state. The scheme
came to be described, very aptly, as "mirror legislation" 60 on the
ground that the legislation at one level of the federal system was
reflected in every detail at the other level. As in Canada, it was
assumed that if "the State law tomorrow were held to be invalid,
The Commonwealth law will still be valid" 61
55. The Offshore Petroleum Agreement, paragraph 3 and 4.
56. Id., paragraph 5.
57. The Acts were enacted under the title the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts,
1967.
58. The Offshore Petroleum Agreement, paragraph 11
59. Id., paragraph 19
60. According to the Senate Report, supra, note 54 at 571, the description
originated with Mr. J. Q. Evers, First Parliamentary Counsel for the
Commonwealth.
61. Id. at p. 571, per Mr. C. W. Harders, Secretary, Commonwealth
Attorney-General's Department. See further C. W. Harders, Australia's Offshore
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The scheme has been successful in the sense that it has not been
challenged before the courts in the nearly ten years since its
implementation. However, it has not been free from difficulty,
some of which is inherent in the scheme itself.
The Australian scheme, unlike the Canadian scheme, depends
upon the continuing, active cooperation of all seven parties. For the
scheme to succeed, the legislation at both the Commonwealth and
State levels must reflect the legislation of the other level in every
detail. Should any crack develop in the mirror, the possibility would
arise that someone would have a real interest in challenging the
legislation at one or other level. Thus, any change in the scheme has
to first be agreed to by all seven parties and then enacted by all
seven parliaments. It was, of course, a remarkable enough
achievement to have all seven agree - and all seven parliaments act
- in the first place but to expect this achievement to repeat itself
every time an amendment might be proposed was overly optimistic.
In the result, the scheme is excessively rigid.
62
This is not a problem of the Canadian scheme under which, it will
be recalled, the provinces will adopt the designated federal
legislation and regulations as amended from time to time, 63 thus
permitting changes in the legislation or regulations to be carried
through automatically without the necessity of prior consent. This
approval solves the problem of rigidity built into the Australian
scheme but, of course, at a price, namely, that changes could be
implemented unilaterally by the federal government. In this respect
it should be noted that the Maritime Offshore Resources Board will
have authority to:
.. . review the administration and management of those mineral
resources, including any policies, legislation and regulations in
respect of such administration and management, and make
recommendations in respect of any such matters to Canada and
the Maritime Provinces;
64
The real effectiveness of this solution will depend upon the extent to
which the Board's recommendations are accepted by the federal
Petroleuin Legislation: A Survey of its Constitutional Background and its Federal
Features (1968), 6 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 415.
62. There has in fact been one instance where agreement between the seven
Governments involved was not translated into legislative amendments by all seven
Parliaments. The circumstances and details are discussed in the Senate Report,
supra, note 54, Chapters 6 and 16.
63. Supra, [text at notes 31 to 32]
64. Paragraph 5 (iv). Emphasis added.
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government. Conceptually the approach would seem preferable to
that adopted in Australia because of its greater flexibility.
There is a further distinction between the Canadian and
Australian situation that should be pointed out. All of the Australian
States are coastal and all were parties to the agreement with the
Commonwealth. There is, therefore, in the Australian context no
risk that a non-participating State might challenge the scheme. 65
The greatest benefit from a comparison with the Australian
scheme comes from an examination of the Report of the Senate
Select Committee on Off-Shore Petroleum Resources. 66 When the
bills provided for in the Agreement 67 were transmitted to the
Australian Senate on November 6, 1967, after passage through the
House of Representatives, the Senate was not happy and a
compromise was reached with the Government whereby it was
agreed that, after the passing of the legislation, a Select Committee
of the Senate would be set up to inquire into and report upon
Off-Shore Petroleum Resources in Australia. The Committee
submitted its exhaustive report in 1971 and included therein a
detailed examination of "the constitutional conception underlying
the legislation." 
68
In brief, the Committee expressed serious reservations about the
Australian scheme, not as to whether it would be effective to
accomplish what the Commonwealth and the states had agreed to,
but as to whether what they had agreed to was desirable. The
Committee reported the following summary of its conclusions on
this matter;
(1) The constitutional conception underlying the legislation is
inconsistent with what should be the proper constitutional
relationship between the Parliament and the executive.
(2) In the context of broad constitutional responsibilities there is
a challenge to the exercise of the functions of Parliament in the
conception of uniform legislation drafted by the executive arms
of seven Australian Governments being presented to the
Parliaments as a fait accompli requiring formal legislative.
approval. This cannot be regarded as strictly inconsistent with the
'proper constitutional responsibilities' of the Commonwealth and
the States as the power always lies with the Parliaments of the
Commonwealth and the States to reject or amend the legislation.
65. Cf., supra, [text at notes 40 to 42]
66. Supra, note 54
67. See supra, note 55
68. Supra, note 54, Chapter 6.
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(3) The Committee does not regard the legislation as being
inconsistent with the 'proper responsibilities' of the Common-
wealth and the States because, as a result of the decision to avoid
litigation which would have resolved the matter, it cannot say
what is the measure of those proper constitutional respon-
sibilities.
(4) The Committee considers that, notwithstanding the advan-
tages to the national interest which the legislation and its
underlying conception has produced, the larger national interest
is not served by leaving unresolved and uncertain the extent of
State and Commonwealth authority in the territorial sea-bed and
the Continental Shelf. 
69
Clearly the Committee thought that the question of jurisdiction
should have been resolved, a course which, in its view, would not
have precluded subsequent cooperation. In its own words:
The Committee does not believe that co-operation can only arisd
if the extent of constitutional authority is left unresolved. 70
Subsequent developments in Australia, however, challenge the
wisdom of this view.
69. Id. at 202. The Committee, however, did acknowledge certain benefits to the
scheme. It reported, at 198-9:
The scheme achieved, notably, the following objectives:
(i) It assured those who were interested in exploring for and exploiting
petroleum resources in the off-shore areas of a security in their titles. It thereby
facilitated the expenditure of large sums which were involved and has provided
a basis for petroleum exploration of virtually the whole of the Australian
off-shore areas.
(ii) It has avoided litigation, which could be time consuming and costly,
between the Commonwealth and the States as to who had constitutional power
over petroleum mining on the off-shore sea-bed. Specifically, it avoided the risk
of the U.S.A. experience of protracted litigation to determine the seaward and
landward boundaries of the territorial seas.
(iii) It secured and reflected Commonwealth and State co-operation in a manner
which may not have been so readily secured if the extent of the constitutional
powers of each in the off-shore areas had been judicially determined.
(iv) It permitted the developrent of a uniform mining code of operation
throughout the whole of the off-shore sea-bed without regard to distinctions
which separate and different control of the territorial sea-bed and continental
shelf may have necessitated.
(v) It permitted the utilisation in the whole of the offshore areas of the
experience of the mines administrations of the State Governments and avoided
the possibility of a costly and duplicated Commonwealth administration having
to be created if Commonwealth cbntrol over part of the off-shore area had been
established and if, consequent thereupon, agreement had not been able to be
reached by the Commonwealth and the States for a joint administration.
70. Id. at 199
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The Australian scheme was designed - as is the Canadian
scheme - to preclude any constitutional challenge to the legislation
implementing the scheme itself. The scheme could not, however,
preclude the possibility that the resolution of some other
constitutional issue might have the effect of determining where the
jurisdiction lay with respect to offshore resources.
To some extent that is what happened in Australia as a
consequence of a prosecution of a fisherman for an offence under
the Commonwealth Fisheries Act 1952.71 The defendent pleaded
that no offence had been committed because the constitutional
power of the Commonwealth with respect to fisheries was limited to
waters within three nautical miles of the Australian coast. In
rejecting this and other defences in Bonser v. LaMacchia72 in 1969,
two of the judges of the High Court of Australia based their
judgments on reasoning that clearly suggested that the Australian
states had no rights in the sea-bed beyond the low water mark. 
73
Commenting on the decision, and other less immediately
authoritative developments,74 the Senate Committee recognized
"the weight of [the] contention" that the area of uncertainty has
become clarified "so that it may be now argued that the
Commonwealth has, and has always had, legislative power over the
natural resources of the territorial sea-bed and the Continental
Shelf" 75 However, it concluded:
The Committee, therefore, considers that the constitutional
authority of the Commonwealth and the States in respect of the
natural resources of the off-shore seabed is still a matter of
contention and doubt. Whatever the illumination which recent
decisions have given to the areas of darkness, there would appear
to be no way of resolving the issue of authority without an actual
decision of the High Court. 76
Perhaps not surprisingly, the federal government did not,
71. Act No. 7, 1952, as amended
72. (1969) 122 C.L.R. 177; (1969), 43 Australian L.J. Reports 275
73. See the judgments of Barwick C. J. and Windeyer J.
74. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Ownership of
Off-Shore Mineral Rights, [1967] S.C.R. 792; 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353; the decision of
the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969]
I.C.i. 3; and a paper delivered by Sir Percy Spender, a former President of the
International Court of Justice, The Great Barrier Reef: Legal Aspects, Australian
Conservation Foundation Symposium on the Future of the Great Barrier Reef,
May, 1969, Sydney.
75. Supra, note 54 at 188
76. Id. at 190
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however, conduct itself as though there continued to be any
uncertainty. In 1973, it introduced to Parliament a Bill for the Seas
and Submerged Lands Act, 1973. 77 By section 6 of that Act, "the
sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea, and in respect of the
airspace over it and in respect of its bed and subsoil, is vested in and
exercisable by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth". By
section 11, "the sovereign rights of Australia as a coastal State in
respect of the continental shelf of Australia, for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, are vested in and
exercisable by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth". Section
16 provides that the Act does not limit or exclude the operation of
any law in force at the date of commencement of the Act, thus
preserving the legislation implementing the Offshore Petroleum
Agreement. 78 In 1975, in New South Wales v. Commonwealth,79 all
the States of Australia brought actions against the Commonwealth
claiming that the Act was wholly or partly invalid. The High Court
of Australia upheld the constitutional validity of the Act.
Thus, notwithstanding the care that was taken under the
Australian scheme to avoid a judicial determination of the
constitutional issue, in fact that issue has since been determined,
and that at the instance of one of the parties to the original
Agreement, although in a different setting from that of the
Agreement itself. There are several observations to be made on
these developments before an attempt is made to assess the merits of
the Canadian Memorandum of Understanding in light of the
Australian experience.
First, the Australian experience demonstrates quite clearly that
there can be no guarantee against the judicial determination of
issues of constitutional jurisdiction in a federal system. There is
always the possibility that a matter will find its way into court
somehow, perhaps, as happened in Australia, initially in an almost
incidental way.
77. No. 161 of 1973
78. Supra, note 54. The long title is:
An Act Relating to Sovereignty in respect of certain Waters of the Sea and in
respect of the Airspace over, and the Sea-bed and Subsoil beneath, those Waters
and to Sovereign Rights in respect of the Continental Shelf and relating also to
the Recovery of Minerals, other than Petroleum, from the Sea-bed and Subsoil
beneath those Waters and from the Continental Shelf.
Emphasis added.
79. (1975), 8 Aust. L. Reports t. See also the prior decision of the High Court of
Australia inR. v. Bull (1974), 48 Australian L.J. Reports 232
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But, secondly, there is nothing in the Australian experience yet to
suggest that the insulation of particular legislation from constitu-
tional challenge by the method of enacting it at both levels of the
federal system is ineffective. It is to be noted that it was the actions
of the Commonwealth that led to the decision in New South Wales
v. Commonwealth and of an ordinary fisherman that led to Bonser
v. LaMacchia - it was not a challenge by anyone affected by the
legislation implementing the Offshore Petroleum Agreement to that
legislation. True, it was a party to the Agreement that effectively
precipitated that determination of the very issue that the Agreement
sought to avoid, but it could never have been suggested that such an
Agreement could preclude a change of heart by one of its
signatories. This was recognized in the Australian Agreement,
which provides:
The Governments acknowledge that this Agreement is not
intended to create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law
but declare that the Agreement shall be construed and given
effect to by the parties in all respects according to the true
meaning and spirit thereof. 80
The Canadian Memorandum of Understanding recognizes the
possibility of withdrawal too by providing that five years' notice of
intent to withdraw shall be given.8 1 But any attempt to argue that
this undermines the concept of the scheme in either Australia or
Canada ignores the fact that the scheme is born of agreement and
only purports to deal with that agreement. The issue it addresses is
not whether a party to such an agreement can withdraw but whether,
given agreement, that agreement can be effectively implemented.
Of course, if there is no reason to believe that agreement can be
maintained for any reasonable length of time the effort involved in
the scheme may not be worthwhile, but that is a different issue. It
must be assumed that if agreement can be reached at all there will be
sufficient good faith to avoid a precipitous withdrawal.
This leads conveniently to the third observation on the Australian
experience. Despite everything, the legislation implementing the
Off-shore Petroleum Agreement stands and the Common Mining
Code continues to be the regulatory regime under which the
offshore petroleum industry is operating. The Agreement and the
code have not been challenged even though the High Court decision
in New South Wales v. Commonwealth makes it fairly clear that
80. The Offshore Petroleum Agreement, paragraph 26
81. Paragraph 13
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their subject-matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth Parliament. The scheme has been successful in
implementing, and insulating from judicial challenge, an agreed
legislative and regulatory regime. And that, after all, was its
purpose.
Finally, the enactment by the Commonwealth Parliament of the
Seas and Submerged Lands Act casts serious doubt on the validity of
the observation of the Senate Committee that cooperation ought not
to be precluded by a determination of who in fact had constitutional
authority. 
82
V. The Merits of the Approach
What, then, can be said in light of all this of the merits of joint
legislative actions as applied to the Canadian context through the
Memorandum of Understanding?
It will be recalled that the main purpose of the Understanding was
to set aside "jurisdictional differences" between the Parties. 83 The
first step in any assessment of the merits of the scheme must be to
examine these differences and their implications. It is not the
purpose here to determine the merits of the respective positions on
either side of the dispute. The question is simply "was there a real
dispute?8
4
In 1967, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a unanimous
opinion that, as between British Columbia and Canada, Canada
owned and had exclusive jurisdiction over the mineral resources of
the territorial sea beyond the low water mark of the Pacific Ocean
and also had exclusive jurisdiction over the mineral resources of the
continental shelf beyond the territorial sea.85 However, the
reasoning of the Court left open the possibility that other provinces
might be able to establish jurisdiction beyond their low water marks
depending upon their particular histories. The federal government
took the view that the principles on which the Court based its
opinion in the B.C. Reference appeared "to be substantially
applicable to the east coast as well as the west coast" 86 but this was
82. Supra, [text at note 70]
83. Supra, [text following note 28]
84. See references supra, note 10
85. Reference re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights, [1967] S.C.R. 792; 65
D.L.R. (2d) 353, theB.C. Reference
86. Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada to the House of Commons in Can.
H. of C. Debates (December 2, 1968) at 3342
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rejected by all the eastern provinces. And there was arguably some
legal justification for this rejection - the principles of the B.C.
Reference might be applicable but those very principles might lead
to different results when applied to different circumstances.
Briefly summarized, 7 the reasoning of the Supreme Court was
that, at common law, the jurisdiction of England and her territories
ended at the low water mark. Although the realm might be extended
to include the territorial sea, such an extension required a positive
assertion of jurisdiction. In the case of British Columbia there had
been no extension of the limits of the Province at the time of
Confederation, nor since, and therefore the boundary ended at the
low water mark of the Pacific Ocean. 88 The territorial sea was not
part of the Province. As far as the continental shelf beyond the
territorial sea was concerned the Court held that British Columbia
had no jurisdiction because the legislative jurisdiction of the
provinces is limited by the British North America Act to matters "in
each Province." 89 The boundary of British Columbia having been
fixed at the low water mark by the Court's answer to the question of
jurisdiction over the territorial sea, it followed that the Province
could not have jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond that
sea. The Court added to its reasons for this conclusion the opinion
that the right to legislate on the continental shelf was a right
acquired in international law and as Canada, and not the provinces,
was the only unit of Confederation recognized in international law
these rights must belong to it.
It is implicit in this reasoning that if the jurisdicition of a province
could be shown to have been extended prior to the entry of that
Province into Confederation it might continue to enjoy that
jurisdiction. The problem with British Columbia's claim was that it
was unable to establish an extension of its jurisdiction prior to 1871.
For the eastern provinces, however, the facts of history are
different. Nova Scotia, for example, had exercised jurisdiction in its
offshore area prior to its entry into Confederation in 186790 and its
87. The decision is commented on in more detail in Ivan L. Head, The Canadian
Offshore Minerals Reference (1968), 18 U. of Toronto L.J. 131.
88. For a subsequent decision concerned with the location of the low water mark
and the definition of the term "inland waters", see Reference re Ownership of the
Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas (1976), 1 B.C.L.R. 97 (C.A.)
89. 30-31 Viet., c.3, s.92 ; R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 5, s.92
90. The particular instances are thoroughly reviewed in the dissenting judgment of
Currie J. A. in Re Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. and County of Cape Breton (1963), 48
M.P.R. 174 at 200ff.; 40 D.L.R. (2d) 593 at 619ff.
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border with New Brunswick is defined as extending to the middle of
the Bay of Fundy. 91 Newfoundland goes so far as to assert a claim
to the whole of the adjacent continental shelf on the grounds that it
had acquired sovereign rights to the area while it enjoyed the status
of a self-governing dominion before it became a province in 1949
and did not surrender these rights under the Terms of Union.9 2 And
quite independent of these arguments that would seek to distinguish
the B.C. Reference is the claim of Nova Scotia to jurisdiction over
the mineral rights of Sable Island, the centre to date of the oil and
gas exploration effort in the Scotian Shelf. That issue was stated
succinctly by Dr. LaForest as follows:
The transfer of Sable Island to the Dominion under item 3 [of the
Third Schedule to the B.N.A. Act, 1867] raises the interesting
problem whether the transfer included the minerals and royalties.
The considerations advanced in connection with the similar
problem in relation to public harbours would indicate that any
base metals may belong to the Dominion but not precious metals
or any other prerogative rights. In determining what was
transferred by the term "Sable Island" it is relevant to note that
the transfer is linked with the transfer of lighthouses and piers and
the Dominion legislative power over the island [under section
91.9 of the B.N.A. Act, 1867] is coupled with "beacons, buoys
and lighthouses." There is thus indicated a limited purpose for
the transfer which is fortified by section 7 of the B.N.A. Act,
1867, which contemplates that the island shall remain within the
limits of the Province. 93
This, it should be emphasized, is a matter that was not touched upon
by the B.C. Reference.
As indicated, it is not the merits of these arguments that are
important in the present context so much as the fact that they can be
made on behalf of the east coast provinces. They have at least a
sufficient basis that the B.C. Reference cannot be said to have
determined the matter of jurisdiction over offshore mineral
resources once and for all. This had raised the possibility, if not
91. Upon the separation of New Brunswick from Nova Scotia in 1784, the
boundary between them was described in Governor Parr's Commission as follows:
To the northward by a line along the centre of the Bay of Fundy to the
Missiquash River, by said river to its source, and thence by a line due east
across the Isthmus to the Bay Verte.
See C. Fergusson, The Boundaries of Nova Scotia and Its Counties (1966), Bulletin
of the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, No. 22 at 10
92. See Martin, supra, note 10
93. G. LaForest, Natural Resources and Public Property under the Canadian
Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) at 72-73
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likelihood, that resolution of the problem would involve further
Supreme Court rulings unless a settlement were negotiated. Indeed
there was a "real" dispute. The implication was, in a word, delay.
In view of the nearly ten years that elapsed between the B.C.
Reference and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding,
one immediately wonders whether the judicial route would have
been such an encumbrance. Would it have taken any longer? The
answer must lie in the realm of speculation. We do know that in the
U.S. the issue of jurisdiction over offshore mineral resources was
still being litigated by the States against the federal government as
recently as 197594 - more than twenty-five years after the issue
was first determined by the Supreme Court. 95 Admittedly the recent
State challenge had negligible prospects for success but the U.S.
experience does suggest that the matter is not one to be resolved
once and for all in a single court decision. It is reasonable to
speculate further that even if there were an unequivocal judicial
determination of the issue in favour of the federal government in
Canada the provinces would want to negotiate on the basis of their
political and "moral" claims to the resources of the offshore area.
Presumably the federal government would at least enter into
negotiations, as it offered to do after the B.C. Reference at its own
initiative. 96 So in fact the judicial route would probably involve any
delay inherent to the litigation itself, followed by a period of
negotiations.
In my view, the matter would probably have taken longer to
resolve - at least to the point of enabling the "successful"
government to implement a regulatory regime with sufficient
security to satisfy the offshore oil and gas industry - if it had been
referred to the Supreme Court of Canada. But the question is not
just one of delay in resolving the dispute over jurisdiction to
regulate. In the context of the oil and gas play off the east coast the
question is what effect that delay has had in discouraging exploration.
This is not to say that the uncertainty as to jurisdiction was not an
impediment to exploratory activity but it probably became less of an
impediment as it was realized that a negotiated settlement would be
94. U.S.v. Maine (1975), 420 U.S. 515; 95 S. Ct. 1155
95. See the authorities cited supra, note 43
96. See, Statement by the Prime Minister on Offshore Mineral Rights, in Can. H.
of C. Debates (December 2, 1968) at 3342 and the statement by the Department of
Energy, Mines Resources of the same date on Offshore Mineral Resources. Both
statements may be found in D. Lewis and A. Thompson, Canadian Oil and Gas
(Toronto: Butterworths, continuing) at Volume 1, Div. A., § 29B.
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reached. Furthermore, the resolve of the Federal and Provincial
Governments to reach agreement was probably a factor in making it
at least possible for oil companies to comply with both federal and
provincial laws pending the conclusion of the negotiations, and thus
get on with the exploration phase of their activities 97 without serious
risk as to the security of their titles. In sum, quite apart from
whether the actual time involved in the negotiated solution has been
longer or shorter, the negative impact on the offshore exploration
effort has been less than would have resulted from litigation of the
issue of jurisdiction.
To summarize to this point; it is my view that the Memorandum
of Understanding9" has resolved the problems arising from
uncertainty as to jurisdiction over offshore mineral resources with
probably the minimum of delay in the circumstances of competing
jurisdictional claims and with minimal impediment to the oil and
gas exploration effort. It will secure the titles of those exploring for
and producing oil or gas, or other minerals, in the future. It has
probably successfully avoided time-consuming and expensive
litigation. It has also avoided any possibility, such as might have
arisen from a judicial resolution of the issue in favour of the federal
government, of the complete exclusion of the provinces from direct
participation in the administration of a matter that is so obviously of
direct interest to them. In other words, it has avoided the "all or
nothing" consequence of a court ruling. Finally, it will result in a
uniform system of administration of offshore mineral resources
throughout an area that will be divided from other regulatory
regimes by the natural and sensible line of the low water mark of
each province. 99 A court resolution of the issue could conceivably
have produced a jurisdictional boundary, such as the outer limit of
the territorial sea, that would not make any practical sense,
particularly in the context of oil and gas operations, and would
probably have required a federal-provincial agreement for the
effective administration of boundary areas anyway. 100
97. See further the discussion supra, [text at notes 11 to 13]. It is important in this
context to bear in mind that the means employed by the oil industry to cope with the
uncertainty as to jurisdiction could only accommodate exploration activities but
would not be acceptable for the production phase of oil and gas exploitation.
98. I assume here of course that the formal Agreement and implementing
legislation will in fact follow.
99. See the comments of Beauchamp, Crommelin and Thompson, supra, note 10
at 463-64
100. The foregoing advantages to the Memorandum of Understanding may be
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But are these merits offset by any of the criticisms that were
identified in discussion of the Australian scheme? First, it will be
recalled that the system of mirror legislation is quite rigid. Rigidity
will be avoided in the implementation of the Canadian Understand-
ing by virtue of the automatic adoption of federal legislation and
regulations as they may be amended from time to time, although
this solution does raise the possibility of unilateral federal action. 'o
The second criticism that should be examined is that expressed by
the Senate Select Committee when it found that there was a
challenge to the exercise of the functions of Parliament in the
presentation of legislation drafted by seven governments "as afait
accompli requiring formal legislative approval."' 0 2 To consider
this observation in the Canadian context, it has to be remembered
again that the Understanding does not contemplate mirror
legislation. Parliament will not be asked to adopt a Common Mining
Code drafted by the four governments involved, as the Australian
Parliament was asked to do without any practical opportunity for
amendment because of the nature of the Australian scheme. ' 0 3 The
Canadian Parliament will be requested to simply agree to the
delegation of the administration of its own independently-enacted
compared with the benefits of the Australian Offshore Petroleum Argreement cited
supra, note 69.
101. See supra, [text at notes 63 to 64]
101. See supra, [text at notes 68 to 69]
103. The Senate Select Committee discussed the issue, supra, note 54 at 192-93,
in detail as follows:
In the same context of broad constitutional responsibilities, the Committee also
recognises a challenge to the exercise of the functions of the Parliament in the
conception of uniform legislation drafted by the executive arms of seven
Australian Governments being presented to the Parliaments as afait accompli
requiring formal legislative approval. The Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
legislation is probably as striking an example as Australian experience can offer
of the dominance of the executive arms and the relegation of the legislative arms
to mere conduits for the effectuating of executive decisions. The role of
Parliament is inevitably what members of Parliament choose to make it, but
agreements and legislative schemes agreed upon by several Governments and
presented to Parliaments for ratification appear to contemplate that the role of
Parliament shall be to reject or accept in toto. There is no practicable
opportunity of amendment for this would destroy the mutuality of what is
proposed. And for Parliament to reject in toto what has been agreed upon
imposes a responsibility in which the ramifications of its exercise extend beyond
the legislative area of the Parliament concerned. A rejection would necessarily
have far-reaching consequences. The tendency is, therefore, for the Parliament
to accept what is proposed - in the manner of a resigned acknowledgement that
what several Governments have in their collective wisdom agreed upon, one
Parliament should not put asunder.
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legislation to the Maritime Offshore Resources Board and even that
only for the area within the terms of the Understanding. The issue
for the provincial legislatures, on the other hand, will be the
adoption of federal legislation as provincial legislation. It cannot be
denied that this will amount to the presentation to the Legislature of
a fait accompli so far as the provisions of the relevant federal
legislation are concerned but that is what the technique of legislation
by adoption must always involve. At least the technique puts that
issue before the particular legislative body for debate on its own
merits. Each Australian Parliament, on the other hand, was
requested to debate the merits of the Common Mining Code in the
knowledge that it must either accept the Code as presented to defeat
the whole scheme.
The foregoing then are the merits, with some reservations, that I
would submit are to be found in the Memorandum of Understand-
ing. They are argued to be merits of the approach of the
Understanding and not of any particular policy that might be
implemented through the mechanism of the Understanding - those
are not in issue here. 104
VI. Conclusion
The Australian Senate Select Committee concluded of the
Australian Offshore Petroleum Agreement that "the larger national
interest" was not served by leaving the question of jurisdiction
unresolved. 105 The validity of this conclusion is the issue of real
interest that now arises for consideration in Canada. The scheme
contemplated by the Memorandum of Understanding would appear
to be workable and will probably succeed in insulating the issue of
jurisdiction from challenge before the courts, as least for so long as
the parties are willing to continue the Understanding. But the
question answered negatively by the Senate was not "Can it be
104. In May, 1977, the Government of Newfoundland issued A White Paper and
Draft Regulations respecting the Administration and Disposition of Petroleum
belonging to Her Majesty in the right of the Province of Newfoundland, reporting,
at 4, that "in the near future, the Government will also make public a
comprehensive document setting out why a political settlement along the lines of
the recent Maritime Provinces Agreement would not protect this Province's
interests". None of the criticisms that are then briefly outlined relates to the merits
of the approach of the Understanding. Indeed the White Paper states, at 5, in
reference to the Australian Offshore Petroleum Agreement, supra, note 54, that the
"Australian Federation is much like ours and such a system could work here."
105. See supra, note 69
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done?" but "Should it be done?" It might be rephrased: "Is the
calculated avoidance of the determination of constitutional
responsibility proper?"
The purpose of this article has not been to attempt an answer to
that question in the abstract. I shall, however, conclude by arguing
for an affirmative answer in the context of the Memorandum of
Understanding, but only in that context.
The British North America Act'106 clearly can provide an answer
to the question of whether the Federal Parliament or the provincial
legislatures have jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of offshore
areas for the purposes of exploiting the resources of those areas. The
problem is not one of whether the Act has an answer but one of
determining what the answer is. Indeed it would seem that we do in
fact have the answer to the question as between Canada and British
Columbia. But the British North America Act has provided us with
that answer, and will provide us with the answer as between Canada
and any other province, only because of the general principle that all
legislative power is assigned by that Act. Certainly, there is nothing
in the subject matter of the exploitation of the resources of the
seabed and subsoil itself that leads to any of the classes of subjects
enumerated in either section 91 or section 92 of the Act. '
0 7
Furthermore, it seems clear to me that we really are talking about
a new subject-matter, new not only in the sense that it was
obviously not contemplated as such by the British North America
Act, but new also in the further sense that it is something more than
a recent technological advance within a broader subject-matter,
such as aeronautics might be said to be within transportation'0 8 or
106. Supra, note41
107. In theB.C. Reference, [1967] S.C.R. 792 at 817; 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 at 375,
the Supreme Court of Canada, referring to the right to explore and exploit the
seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea, stated:
Legislative jurisdiction with respect to such lands must, therefore, belong
exclusively to Canada, for the subject-matter is one not coming within the
classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces
within the meaning of the initial words of 91 ....
Having reached this conclusion, the Court did not have to consider explicitly
whether such jurisdiction might be a matter within the classes of subjects
enumerated in section 91 itself but there is no suggestion even implicit in the
Opinion that the Court regarded the matter as being within those classes of subjects
either.
108. In Re Regulation and Control of Aeronatics, [1932] A.C. 54; [1932] 1
D.L.R. 58, the Privy Council seems to have so regarded aeronatics. The Board
said, id. at 73-74; [1932] 1 D.L.R. at 67:
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radio within communication or "telegraphs". ' 0 9 The observations
of Gibbs J. in the High Court of Australia in New South Wales v.
Commonwealth are pertinent:
To say the rights of coastal States in respect of the continental
shelf existed from the beginning of time may or may not be
correct as a matter of legal theory. In fact, however, the rights
now recognized represent the response of international law to
modem developments of science and technology, which permit
the seabed to be exploited in a way which it was quite impossible
for governments or lawyers of earlier centuries to foresee. In this
matter the arguments of history are stronger than those of logic.
[The rights to the continental shelf which the Convention on the
Continental Shelf now accords to coastal States], if theoretically
inherent in the sovereignty of coastal States, were in fact the
result of the operation of a new legal principle. 10
It is submitted that in a somewhat unique sense the rights with
which we are here concerned indeed are new.
What emerges from this is that the British North America Act
would be called upon to determine the constitutional responsibility
for a new subject-matter the likes of which it never contemplated
and which it will only answer at all because it insists that it has an
answer to any question of legislative competence. I appreciate that
such reasoning would not persuade the Supreme Court to decline to
apply the Act to the issue and perhaps most wisely such reasoning
would not even be presented in that place. I" However, it does seem
to me to justify the avoidance of a judicial determination of the issue
in the manner agreed to by Canada and the Maritime Provinces; all
the more so when it is remembered that a court determination under
the British North America Act must result in total victory for one
party and total defeat for the other. A judicial determination under
the terms of the Act is just not appropriate. 11
2
In their Lordships view, transport as a subject is dealt with in certain branches
both of S.91 and of S. 92, but neither of those sections deals specially with that
branch of transport which is concerned with aeronautics.
[Emphasis added]
109. In Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication, [1932] A.C. 304 at
314; [1932] 2 D.L.R. 81 at 85, the Privy Council expressed the opinion that radio
was within the word "telegraphs"
l10. 8Aust. L.R. I at49
111. See the comments of Laskin C.J. in the Thorson Case cited supra, note 47.
112. 1 am not persuaded of the validity, at least not in the Canadian context, of the
concern expressed in the Senate Report, supra, note 54 at 199-200, in the following
terms:
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Perhaps in other circumstances the issue might be properly
resolved by constitutional amendment.
In respect of matters such as protection and conservation of natural features and
resources of the off-shore waters and the off-shore sea-bed, the question of who
has authority or responsibility to act is unknown. In areas of public and political
controversy - into which questions of conservation and pollution have moved
- the inability to identify political responsibility is as unsatisfactory as the
inability, because of disputed and uncertain power, to initiate action or
authoritatively to disclaim responsibility. This must remain the situation while
the constitutional question is unresolved.
The concern seems to be that uncertainty as to jurisdiction would result in
disclaimers of responsibility and hence inaction. However, such a risk surely would
be minimal. It would be surprising indeed if the Canadian Government should ever
admit of any possibility other than it has exclusive jurisdiction in the offshore area
for all purposes other than those expressly dealt with in the Memorandum of
Understanding. With such a claim must go political responsibility for all of the
implications of the claim.
